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Abstract. An ultimate Universal theory – a complete theory that accounts, via few
and simple first principles, for all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be
observed – has been, and still is, the aspiration of most physicists and scientists. Yet,
a basic principle that is embodied in the results of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems is
that self-referencing leads to logical conflict or failure, as in the liar paradox or Russell’s
paradox. In physical theories self-referencing necessarily occurs when it is realized that
the observer is also a participant in the experienced phenomena we, humans, are part
of the Universe while observing it. Therefore self-referencing, and consequently logical
conflicts, are unavoidable, and any theory pretending to be Universal is bound to be
incomplete.
Keywords : Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem; theory of everything; self-referencing;
logical paradoxes;
1. Introduction
Is it possible to encompass the full extent of the Universe with a finite number of first
principles and inference rules ?
The belief that it is possible to arrive at a complete theory that fully describes the
whole of the physical world a theory that accounts, via few and simple first principles,
for all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be observed has been, for
many-many years and for most researches, a fundamental tenet of the scientific research.
Such a theory, sometimes known as “theory of everything” (TOE), is expected to
be the ultimate theory of the Universe. A. Einstein put it very clearly :
It is the grand object of all theory to make these irreducible elements as simple
and as few in number as possible, without having to renounce the adequate
representation of any empirical content whatever. [1]
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By “these irreducible elements” Einstein referred to the fundamental first principles
of the theory. It is very clear that in spite of all the hopes and aspirations, we are still
very-very far from reaching such a goal. Quoting also S. W. Hawking :
.. How far can we go in our search for understanding and knowledge? Will we
ever find a complete form of the laws of nature? (a complete form = a set of
rules that in principle at least enable us to predict the future to an arbitrary
accuracy, knowing the state of the universe at one time.)
Up to now, most people have implicitly assumed that there is an ultimate theory
that we will eventually discover. Indeed, I myself have suggested we might find
it quite soon. [2]
However, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [3, 4, 5, 6] implies that any formal
structure, based on a finite number of first principles and inference rules, which is rich
enough, cannot be at the same time both consistent and complete. Completeness, in
terms of physical theories, implies determinism – if the necessary initial data are given
then the theory allows us to predict the state of a physical system any time in the future.
Does Go¨del’s theorem apply to physics ?
A common argument in favour of applying Go¨del’s theorem to physics, is, more or
less, that “Go¨del’s theorem applies to arithmetics which is the basis of mathematics,
physics uses mathematics, therefore Go¨del’s theorem applies to physics” [7, 8]. However,
the counter-argument points to the fact that there are mathematical theories to which
Go¨del’s theorem does not apply, e.g. geometry [6], and that this is the type of
mathematics that physics uses, therefore we should not expect that Go¨del’s theorem
applies to physics [9, 10, 11].
The purpose of this article is to present and put forward another argument,
which I believe is the decisive one. Go¨del’s theorem (whenever it applies) points to
incompleteness in the sense that there will always be claims that may be formulated
within this formal system but are undecidable – propositions that cannot be either proved
or refuted. A close inspection of Go¨del’s theorem demonstrates that this undecidability
arises when the claims are self-referential, or, more precisely, when the system asks to
define itself in its own terms, leading to logical conflicts or paradoxes.
Self-referencing occurs in physics whenever the observer is also part of the observed
system. In most physical systems this is not the case, therefore the counter-argument
should apply. However, when it is the whole Universe that is dealt with, then we, the
observers, are also part of it, and Go¨del’s theorem should apply.
In the following we discuss self-referencing in Go¨del’s theorem, its relation with
our involvement in the Universe, its application to physical theories, and the eventual
consequences – the impossibility of a finite “ultimate Universal theory” or “theory of
everything”.
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2. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and physical theories
Structurally, physical theories are expected to be complete formal (logical) systems,
with a finite, consistent set of fundamental principles (axioms) and a set of deduction
and inference rules which together produce predictions regarding natural phenomena;
and completeness implies the expectation that the predictions of the theory encompass
all the phenomena already observed and those that will ever be observed, within the
realm covered by the theory.
Such theories may be likened to trees : The basis of the theory, the set of
fundamental principles, is like the roots of the tree; the products and predictions of
the theory are like the leaves, flowers and fruits of the tree; and the rules of inference
and deduction are like the trunk and the branches which lead the sap from the roots to
the leaves and flowers. In a tree the sap flows up by the force of capillarity; in a theory
deductions are made from first principles to predictions by the power of logic.
A fundamental property of logic is embodied in Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
[3, 4, 5, 6] which implies that
In any consistent and rich enough formal structure, based on a finite number of
first principles and inference rules, there will always be propositions that may
be formulated within this formal system but are undecidable. Such a theory
cannot be both consistent and complete.
Go¨del’s theorem has been discussed heavily in the contexts of mathematics, logic,
and artificial intelligence [6, 12, 13, 14]. It’s relation to physics seems to be much
less discussed. Clearly, if Go¨del’s theorem applies to a physical theory then this
theory cannot be complete – as pointed out in the Introduction, there will always be
propositions that may be formulated within the theory but are undecidable because of
self-referencing that leads to logical conflicts. Incompleteness in physical theories implies
non-determinism – the existence of processes whose outcome cannot be predicted by the
theory.
A general argument raised for the applicability of Go¨del’s theorem to physics is
that since physical theories use mathematics and logic they cannot be complete [7, 8].
However, there are various mathematical theories (e.g., geometry or reduced versions of
arithmetics) [6] to which Go¨del’s theorem does not apply they are too simple for that
and are, therefore, complete. The counter-argument that is brought up then is that
the mathematics used for the physical theories we know so far is relatively simple, not
suffering from incompleteness, so there is no place to apply Go¨del’s theorem to physics
[9, 10, 11].
These arguments miss the main aspect of Go¨del’s theorem – that undecidabilty,
indicating a logical failure, appears there as a result of self-referencing. Indeed, several
authors linked Go¨del’s theorem with cases of undecidability in physics, especially
quantum theory [15, 16, 17]. However, there may be various reasons for undecidability,
not necessarily associated with self-referencing and logical conflicts. Yet, self-referencing
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is very relevant to physical theories, because we, humans, the observers, are also
participants – we are part of the Universe while observing it. In the following we
discuss self-referencing in relation to Go¨del’s theorem, and then its relevance to physical
theories.
3. Self-referencing and Go¨delean propositions
A core principle of Aristotelian logic is the principle of excluded third, expected to be
obeyed by all formal (logical) systems [18, 19] : Any claim or prediction that may be
formulated within the theory is decidable – can be either proved or refuted, no other
option. Yet, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem identifies the existence of a special kind of
claims and propositions, which are well phrased in a given logical system, but contrary
to expectations can neither be proven correct nor refuted as wrong. Such claims and
propositions are referred to in the following as “Go¨delean”, and with them the theory
necessarily becomes incomplete.
Certainly, not every unanswerable proposition is Go¨delean. Go¨delean propositions
are undecidable not because of lack of data but because of the way they are formulated
within the formal system – self-reference leading to a conflict which the formal system,
with all its axioms and first principles, cannot resolve :
In Go¨del’s theorem itself, it is expressing both arithmetical statements and meta-
arithmetical statements (i.e., statements about arithmetics) in the same language
which creates the possibility of self-reference, allowing inevitable logical conflict. More
adaptable to physics, this basic principle underlying Go¨del’s theorem is illustrated with
some well-known so-called logical paradoxes [20] : the liar paradox, the barber paradox,
Russell’s paradox, etc. (see Appendix). A close examination of Go¨del’s theorem and
these paradoxes highlights that Go¨delean propositions are self-referential, and appear
when the system seeks to define itself in its own terms : Is the man a liar or speaking the
truth? Does the barber shave himself or not? Is the set M (the set of all sets that are
not members of themselves in Russell’s paradox) a member of itself or not? – then the
system turns out to be unable to to provide an unambiguous answer, and this inability
manifests as a logical failure.
Figure 1. “Drawing Hands”
M.C. Escher (1948)
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A very impressive graphical visualization of the logical conflict arising due to self-
reference is offered by the drawing “Drawing Hands” of the Dutch artist Escher† – the
logically impossible realization of two hands mutually drawing each other (Figure 1).
Hence the conclusion that when such self-reference occurs within a formal system
it necessarily leads to logical failure – logical systems are unable to refer to themselves
logically [21]. This is a fundamental trait of classical logic, implied by Go¨del’s theorem.
Thus, by means of Go¨del’s theorem logic points to its own limitations – the ‘third’
cannot be excluded, and sufficiently large formal structures cannot be both consistent
and complete.
4. Self-referencing and physical theories
By Go¨del’s theorem, a theory needs to be sufficiently rich and large enough to allow
self-referential, Go¨delean propositions. It depends on the domain encompassed by the
theory. Classical theories, like geometry, Newtonian mechanics (excluding the question
of relative/absolute space and time), Maxwell’s electrodynamics, are free from self-
referencing. Such theories are simply not large enough - the observer is no more than
a witness, not involved at all, completely separated from the subject-matter, and the
theories may therefore be complete.
The case is essentially different with theories that aspire to encompass the whole
Universe, covering all the phenomena in Nature. A Universal theory, large enough to
encompass the whole of the Universe, must include the observers as part of its subject-
matter – after all, we reside in the Universe and are part of it. Once the inquirers are
themselves part of the subject-matter, self-referencing is unavoidable.
This was already recognized by Hawking some years ago,
We and our models are both part of the universe we are describing. Thus a
physical theory is self-referencing, like in Go¨dels theorem. One might therefore
expect it to be either inconsistent or incomplete .. [2]
and may be understood in several, inter-connected, ways :
In most observations the observer seems to be only a witness, and the physical
process seems to be independent of the observer. But if the observer intervenes with the
physical process, say, by determining the mode of observation (e.g., ‘wave or particle’,
or ‘one slit or two slits’), thus determining the outcome of the process, this is an act of
self-reference.
Self-referencing requires two for tango – and indeed, relativity theory (RT)
emphasizes the fact that any observation is observer-dependent, depending on an
arbitrarily chosen point-of-view (frame of reference); and quantum theory (QT) tells us
that results of observations depend on an arbitrarily chosen mode of observation. These
† M.C. Escher. His works can be found on the official website http://www.mcescher.com/ and on a
wide variety of other websites.
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arbitrary choices are not controlled or determined by or via current physical theories
(RT, QT) – for these theories these arbitrary choices are metaphysical statements about
the physical process, like the meta-arithmetical Go¨delean statement in Go¨del’s proof.
Therefore, these arbitrary choices together with the process they refer to, constitute
self-referencing couples.
Self-referencing is directly associated with the evolution of the Universe : As in the
two-slit experiment, the mode of observation determines the fate of the physical process,
thus directly affecting the evolution of the Universe. Victor Hugo once said that Creation
lives and evolves; the human is only a witness. This was the common viewpoint up until
the 20th century. Now it is evident that we are not simply bystanders on a cosmic stage
– we are active participants in the evolution of the Universe, the cosmos being made
real in part by our own observations. This is certainly reminiscent of the ancient Jewish
tradition, that the human is participant in Creation.
Therefore, another feature of self-referencing in physics is that our observations
contribute to the creation of physical reality. But then, the observer and his deciding
faculty are also part of the Universal reality, and should be included in a theory
pretending to encompass the whole Universe. Modern physics theories (RT, QT) are
still not self-referential, because they do not include the observer. Such an inclusion
should be an integral part of any futuristic, new-generation Universal physical theory.
5. Can Go¨del’s theorem be circumvented ?
Since acts of observation may affect physical reality, these acts must be covered
by the physical theory, which must be, therefore, self-referential. While current
physical theories do not include the observers as part of their subject-matter, futuristic
theories, pretending to be ultimately Universal or ‘theories of everything’, must take the
observers into account, and therefore will have to be self-referential. Inevitably Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem will have to apply, rendering the physical theory incomplete
and therefore non-deterministic.
We arrive, therefore, at the inevitable conclusion that there cannot be an ultimate,
all-encompassing, Universal physical theory which is founded upon few and simple, finite
number of first principles.
The dissatisfaction that many people feel with this conclusion lead to looking for
ways to bypass, or get around, this outcome of Go¨del’s theorem [9, 10]. Is it really
possible, in some way, to remedy Go¨delean conflicts, especially those that appear in a
Universal theory ?
The fact that current physical theories do not include the observers as part of
their subject-matter, and are therefore not self-referential, cannot be used as an escape
route, because, as argued above, the Universal physical theory will have to include the
observers.
Another possibly considered escape route is the following :
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The inability of a theory to decide regarding certain propositions indicates that
fundamental principles are missing. Physical theories, besides being formal logical
structures, have to stand the test of physical reality. Go¨delean undecidability is a
feature of the theory, as distinct from the physical reality: When a phenomenon is
observed, or an experiment is performed, there could be some questions that cannot
be answered by the theory, while they are answered by the physical reality via the
results of the experiment. Therefore, a Go¨delean conflict may be, ostensibly, solved by
adding new axioms – additional, new fundamental principles that are in concordance
with phenomena and the results of experiments – that sort out the conflict. This was the
philosophy behind the (unsuccessful) hidden-variables approach. But then, as already
observed by Go¨del, the result is another, larger, new theory, in which new Go¨delean
propositions ensue. Attempting to solve Go¨delean conflicts in this way will be a never-
ending series of additions of new ‘first principles’. Go¨delean conflicts are inescapable!
[6]
Thus another recognition by Hawking :
Maybe it is not possible to formulate the theory of the universe in a finite
number of statements. This is very reminiscent of Go¨del’s theorem .. [2]
The many attempts to remedy the self-referencing paradoxes in the field of logic
involve two main ingredients [20, 21]:
• Extending the classical binary range of truth values of ‘1’ and ‘0’ or ‘true’ and
‘false’, by adding new truth values like ‘undefined’ (neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’), ‘both
true and false’, or even a whole range of numerical truth values between 0 and 1.
The extended range of truth values may correspond, physically, to, say, viewing the
electron as both particle and wave, or to the possible spectrum of results of a quantum
experiment.
• Regarding the realm upon which the theory operates as an hierarchical structure,
a set of ordered levels, so that referencing may occur only from a higher level to a
lower one.
Self-reference paradoxes start with two entities, say a and b, with a unidirectional
hierarchical relation of superiority b ↘ a between them (e.g., b declares attribute a;
b shaves/doesn’t shave a; a is/isn’t a member of set b; b draws figure a; etc.). If a and b
belong to two different spaces, say a ∈ A and b ∈ B, so that each entity in B is superior
to each entity in A then there is no paradox. But if a and b belong to the same space
then the opposite relation a ↘ b is also possible, and self-reference paradoxes become
possible.
Therefore, self-reference paradoxes can be remedied only in a hierarchical structure.
This is reminiscent of the solution to self-referencing in Russell’s paradox within set
theory: Construction of an infinite hierarchy of sets, with sets at a certain level being
the members of higher-level sets [21]. Paradoxes are indications of misconceptions,
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and self-reference paradoxes appear when spaces or levels that should be separated are
instead squeezed into just one space or level.
Self-referencing necessarily involves human consciousness‡: Inquiries, whether
regarding a particular phenomenon or the entire Universe, and decisions regarding
the mode of observation, all take place within the realm of our consciousness. We –
humans, people, observers – we are all, with our consciousness, part of the Universe. We
observe and inquire the Universe and our part in it from and within our consciousness.
Therefore, questions regarding the Universe are asked from within it, and at least some
of the questions that we may ask about the Universe and Natural phenomena are self-
referential.
This suggests that our consciousness must be seen as hierarchically structured, so
that consciousness refers to itself from a high level to a lower one: entities that appear
separate at a certain level seem to be, from a higher level of consciousness, part of a
single complex (as the whole and its parts). This, at least potentially, is an infinite
hierarchy, which, as we know from set theory, grows exponentially.
6. Concluding remarks
Any theory that aspires to encompass the whole Universe, with all the phenomena
in Nature, is the Universe, via our consciousness, inquiring itself. If we regard the
Universe as a one big whole, possibly infinite, realm, without hierarchy, then there
must be Go¨delean, self-referencing, propositions. Consequently, the theory is necessarily
incomplete there will be issues of physical reality about which the theory cannot make
predictions.
When a new phenomenon is observed that the current theory cannot explain, we
seek for new first principles that cover these new observations. But the addition of new
first principles cannot solve the Go¨delean conflict, because the new theory will still be
the Universe inquiring itself, and self-referencing is unavoidable. Thus, more and more
new first principles will have to be added, ad infinitum.
That some new observations require new first principles has always been the drive
for scientific advancement. In this way the scientific research produces more and more
insights, understandings and knowledge, within larger and larger theories. Still, many
people wish to arrive, hopefully in their life-time, to a finite, final theory that fully
describes, with few and simple first principles, the whole of the physical world, hoping
and believing in the vision put so clearly by Einstein in the quotation brought in the
Introduction. But Go¨del’s theorem indicates that this is a never-ending process.
Therefore, it is impossible to encompass with a finite number of first principles and
inference rules the full extent of the Universe. For any final set of first principles there
‡ Mind and consciousness are meant here, in a broad sense, as the domain where mental processes take
place and we interpret our experiences, whether internal or external, and find meaning and significance
for them.
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are, or will be found, some issues about which the theory is unable to make predictions.
The expectation for a finite TOE rests on the ancient belief that the Universe is fixed
and eternal. But as we have learnt from modern physics, relativistic and quantum, which
emphasizes the rle of the observer and where at least some predictions are observer-
dependent, our inquiries and observations affect the evolution of the Universe. Therefore
the Universe is not fixed, but constantly evolving, with the possibility of new phenomena
appearing. The “cake of knowledge and understanding” is not fixed, unchanging, but
rather ever-growing, with new insights, new knowledge, new information, that are not
derivable from old ones. Thus there will always be more to be known, to be revealed,
to discover; not less.
In conclusion, there will always be some questions seeking the understanding of
the Universe as a whole which are – and will be – answerable only partially. Each
new answer will enlarge our understanding, but at the same time will make us realize
how little we actually know and how much more there is to be known and understood.
The more we know then there is, and will be, even more to be known and reveal. The
prospects to discover become larger, not smaller.
Thus the recognition that “The more we know, the more we know that we know
less .. and it will never stop !” is unavoidable. The search for Natural laws is, and will
always be, open-ended.
The impossibility of a finite “ultimate Universal theory” or “theory of everything”
(and therefore of any such theory, because a theory cannot be based on an infinite
number of first principles), and the fact that it is organically inherent in the nature of
the scientific process, as is asserted by Go¨del’s theorem, is not realized by many, and
when it is it seems, unfortunately, to cause much disappointment [9, 10]. However, if
a finite ultimate theory that fully describes, with few and simple first principles, the
whole of the physical world, were possible, then what new first principles will be left for
the coming generations to reveal and discover? What prospects would they have then?
Thus we end with one more quotation of Hawking:
Some people will be very disappointed if there is not an ultimate theory that can
be formulated as a finite number of principles. I used to belong to that camp,
but I have changed my mind. I’m now glad that our search for understanding
will never come to an end, and that we will always have the challenge of new
discovery. Without it, we would stagnate. Go¨dels theorem ensured there would
always be a job .. for physicists. [2]
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Appendix A.
Here is a sample of the most well-known logical paradoxes caused by self-reference:
Appendix A.1. The liar paradox
The most basic and best-known of the logical paradoxes, telling of someone who declares
of himself “I am a liar”. Formally, the paradox consists in the declaration “this sentence
is false”, so that if only two truth values are acceptable (true = 1, false = 0) the sentence
is well formulated in the language of logic but has no logical sense. This is a paradox
of self-testimony.
A basic formal extension of the liar’s paradox is structured as follows:
“A: Sentence B is true”, “B: Sentence A is false.”
Here every sentence is, separately, logically well constructed, but their combination
leads to a conflict. It is possible, of course, to extend this presentation to any number
of sentences, so that the logical failure is revealed only in the overall array.
Appendix A.2. The barber paradox
The story goes of a small French village, in which there is only one barber, and he shaves
every day all the men that do not shave themselves. Then the question is, since the
barber also need to shave, “Who shaves the barber ?”
The sentence “every morning Mr. Jean-Pierre enters the barber’s shop and gets a
shave” is very well defined within the context of the barber’s story. It leads to a conflict
only if we are told that Mr. jean-Pierre is the barber himself, i.e., when it becomes a
self-referencing proposition.
Appendix A.3. Russell’s paradox
The British philosopher Bertrand Russell challenged the question “Can a set be a
member of itself?” by defining a set M as “the set of all the sets that do not contain
themselves as their own members”. If M is a member of itself, then it cannot be,
and vice versa. The conflict shows that such a set is impossible, and thus defies the
possibility that a set may contain itself as a member of itself.
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